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Abstract
In this paper we introduce two new classes of weighted values for coalition structures with
related extensions to level structures. The values of both classes coincide on given player
sets with Harsanyi payoffs and match therefore adapted standard axioms for TU-values
which are satisfied by these values.
Characterizing elements of the values from the new classes are a new weighted pro-
portionality within components property and a null player out property, but on different
reduced games for each class. The values from the first class, we call them weighted Shap-
ley alliance coalition structure values (weighted Shapley alliance levels values), satisfy the
null player out property on usual reduced games. By contrast, the values from the sec-
ond class, named as weighted Shapley collaboration coalition structure values (weighted
Shapley collaboration levels values) have this property on new reduced games where a
component decomposes in the components of the next lower level if one player of this
component is removed from the game. The first class contains as a special case the Owen
value (Shapley levels value) and the second class includes a new extension of the Shapley
value to coalition structures (level structures) as a special case.
Keywords Cooperative game ·Weighted Shapley coalition structure values ·Weighted
Shapley levels values · Dividends · Null player out
1 Introduction
Whereas e. g. governments, firms or political organizations are mostly structured strong
hierarchical and in a statical manner supply chains or electricity and other networks have
often a more dynamical and not so strong top down frame work. For hierarchical organized
structures Winter (1989) developed a model, called level structure, that is an extension
of a coalition structure (Aumann and Dre`ze, 1974). Therefore Winter (1989) introduced
his value, we name it Shapley levels value, in accordance, e. g., with A´lvarez-Mozos et al.
(2017). This value is an extension of the Owen value (Owen, 1977), itselves an extension
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2of the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953b). A level structure consists of ordered partitions (the
levels) of the original player set. Each partition consists of disjoint coalitions of players
(the components) such that each component of a level higher that contains a player from
a component of the lower level must contain all players of this component. So in a level
structure the lowest level contains all the singletons as components and the highest level
contains the grand coalition as the only component.
Vidal-Puga (2012) introduced a weighted value for coalition structures, extended by
Go´mez-Ru´a and Vidal-Puga (2011) to level structures. There the weights are given by
the size of the coalitions. The size of coalitions may be a considerable magnitude that is
to take into account by sharing the payoff in a cooperative game. But often also other
factors, e. g. in the context of cost allocation, play a decisive role: the size of firms or
departments, political influence, fixed costs of the units, spent time of working members
and so on. Recently Besner (2018b) extended their value to a class of values with arbitrary
exogenously given weights, called weighted Shapley hierarchy levels values which extend
the weighted Shapley values (Shapley, 1953a). These values don’t satisfy the null player
property in general.
Also Levy and McLean (1989) and McLean (1991) extended the weighted Shapley
values to coalition structures for arbitrary weights which not depend on the coalition
function. The main class of these values, in Dragan (1992) called McLean weighted
coalition structure values, is in Besner (2018a) extended to level structures, called weighted
Shapley support levels values. There the hierarchy of the level structure is treated more
statically. If a sub-coalition of a component deals with other coalitions outside of this
component the sub-coalition is supported by the weight of the whole component. In
general, without further statement, it is not clear how to go on if a player is removed from
the player set meaning what are the weights of the new components in the new game.
In this respect, the Shapley levels value has an exceptional character within this class of
values. It can be easily be treated also dynamically since the used weights are in a game
where some players are removed the same as before, they are always equal.
To handle also weighted values for level structures in the same manner we introduce
the class of weighted Shapley alliance levels values (weighted Shapley alliance coalition
structure values). There weights, similar as by the weighted Shapley hierarchy levels
values, are assigned not only to components, each subset of a component owns a weight
too. If a player is removed from a component the remaining players build a new component
with the original weight of the coalition of these players. Thus here the coalitions within
a component can act more independently in the corset of a level structure. They can act
with players outside of the component without consultation of the whole component but
all involved players of a component form always an alliance. The weighted Shapley alliance
levels values coincide with payoff vectors, called Harsanyi payoffs, from the Harsanyi set
(Hammer, 1977; Vasil’ev, 1978) and inherit so for fixed player sets all properties of these
payoff vectors adapted to level structures. Interestingly, the Shapley levels value (Owen
value) is also a special case of the Shapley alliance levels values and our axiomatization
gives so deeper insight into this value too. A characterizing element of the weighted
Shapley alliance levels values is a null player out property. If we delete a null player this
doesn’t influence the payoff to the other players.
In some situations it is possible that if a player leaves a component the component loses
its cohesion. For such situations the values from our second new class, called weighted
3Shapley collaboration levels values (weighted Shapley collaboration coalition structure
values) are recommended. Especially if a null player is removed from a component and
the coalition of the remaining players of this component is smashed in the next smaller
components. Then the payoff to all players is the same as before in the game with the
complete player set. If some players of a component B are involved in a bargaining
situation with players from outside of B all players which form the next largest sub-
component of B collaborate together. So also here the players of a component can act
more independently. Here, similar as by the weighted Shapley support levels values,
only the components need a weight. As a special case of these values we single out a new
extension of the Shapley value to level structures and name it Shapley collaboration levels
value (Shapley collaboration caolition structure value).
Whereas the Shapley levels value, the weighted Shapley support levels values and the
weighted Shapley hierarchy levels values satisfy the level game property (the payoff to
all players of a component sum up to the payoff to the component in a game where
components are the players) the values from our new classes don’t satisfy this property
in general. The absence of this characteristic reveals that in our new classes the players
are more independent from a nesting component.
A level structure with only two levels coincides with a coalition structure. Thus all
presented axioms and so the given axiomatizations coincide with related axioms and
axiomatizations formulated for coalition structures. Therefore we deal in this paper with
coalition structures only marginally and concentrate on level structures so that in this
respect the reader has to transform adequate results by his own.
After the introduction section 2 provides some preliminaries. In the main part of the
paper we introduce in section 3 the weighted Shapley alliance levels values, in section 4
the weighted Shapley collaboration levels values and, as a special case, in section 5 the
Shapley collaboration levels value. An example in section 6 compares the proposed values,
section 7 gives the conclusion and an appendix (section 8) provides all the proofs.
2 Preliminaries
In this paper some definitions and notations will follow with Besner (2018a). Let a
countably infinite set U of all potential players be given and let N the set of all finite
subsets of U which are non-empty. A TU-game can be defined as a pair (N, v) where
N ∈ N is a player set and v a coalition function from the power set 2N into the real
numbers R such that v(∅) = 0. We call subsets S ⊆ N coalitions with a worth v(S); ΩS
denotes the set of all nonempty subsets of S ⊆ N . If we regard only a restricted player
set S ∈ ΩN we denote by (S, v) the restriction of (N, v). We denote by VN the set of
all TU-games with player set N .
A player i ∈ N is called a null player in v if v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S), S ⊆ N\{i}; we call
two different players i, j ∈ N (mutually) dependent (Nowak and Radzik, 1995) in v if
v(S ∪{k}) = v(S) for all S ⊆ N\{i, j} and k ∈ {i, j}. For all S ⊆ N and T ∈ ΩN a game
(N, uT ) ∈ VN with uT (S) = 1 if T ⊆ S and uT (S) = 0 otherwise is called an unanimity
game. We define the dividends ∆v(S) (Harsanyi, 1959) by
∆v(S) :=
{
v(S)−∑R(S ∆v(R), if S ∈ ΩN, and
0, if S = ∅. (1)
4It is well-known that any coalition function v on N can be uniquely presented by
v =
∑
T∈ΩN
∆v(T )uT . (2)
Coalitions S ⊆ N are called active in v if ∆v(S) 6= 0.
A coalition structure on N is a partition B := {B1, ..., Bm} of the player set N where
Bk 6= ∅, 1 ≤ k ≤ m, Bk ∩ B` = ∅, 1 ≤ k < ` ≤ m, and
⋃m
k=1Bk = N . Each B ∈ B is
called a component and B(i) denotes the component that contains a player i ∈ N .
By Winter (1989), each finite sequence B := {B0, ...,Bh+1} of coalition structures Br, 0 ≤
r ≤ h+ 1, on N is called a level structure on N if B0 = {{i}: i ∈ N}, Bh+1 = {N} and
each Br is a refinement of Br+1 for all r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, that means that Br(i) ⊆ Br+1(i) for all
i ∈ N . We denote by LN the set of all level structures with player set N ; we call Br the
r-th level of B; for a component Bk ∈ Bk, 0 ≤ k ≤ r ≤ h + 1, Br(Bk) is the component
of the r-th level that contains Bk and by B we denote the set of all components B ∈ Br
of all levels Br∈ B, 0 ≤ r ≤ h.
An LS-game is a triple (N, v,B) where (N, v) ∈ VN and B ∈ LN. We denote by
VLN the set of all LS-games on N . Please note that we have for each (N, v,B0) ∈ VLN
with a trivial level structure B0 := {B0,B1} a corresponding TU-game (N, v) and for
each (N, v,B1) ∈ VLN, B1 := {B0,B1,B2}, a corresponding game with coalition structure
(Aumann and Dre`ze, 1974; Owen, 1977).
Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = {B0, ...,Bh+1}, and T ∈ ΩN. From a level structure on N
follows a level structure on T by eliminating the players in N\T . With coalition structures
Br|T := {B ∩ T : B ∈ Br, B ∩ T 6= ∅}, 0 ≤ r ≤ h + 1, the new level structure on T is
given by B|T := {B0|T , ...,Bh+1|T} ∈ LT and (T, v,B|T ) ∈ VLT is called the restriction
of (N, v,B) to player set T .
A TU-value φ is a map that assigns to any (N, v) ∈ VN a vector φ(N, v) ∈ RN, an
LS-value ϕ is a map that assigns to any (N, v, B) ∈ VLN a vector ϕ(N, v, B) ∈ RN.
Let R++ the set of all positive real numbers. We define WN := {f : N → R++} with
wi := w(i) for all w ∈WN and i ∈ N as the set of all positive weight systems on the player
set N , we define W2N := {f : 2N\∅ → R++} with wS := w(S) for all w ∈ W2N, S ∈ ΩN,
as the set of all positive weight systems on all non-empty coalitions S ⊆ N and we define
WB := {f : B → R++}1 with wB := w(B) for all w ∈ WB, B ∈ B, as the set of all positive
weight systems on the components of all levels r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, of a level structure B.
For all (N, v) ∈ VN and w ∈W the (simply) weighted Shapley values2 Shw (Shapley,
1953a) are defined by
Shwi (N, v) :=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
wi∑
j∈S wj
∆v(S) for all i ∈ N.
If all weights are equal we obtain as a special case of a weighted Shapley value the Shapley
value Sh (Shapley, 1953b), given by
Shi(N, v) :=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
∆v(S)
|S| for all i ∈ N.
1Note that WB is a subset of W2N.
2We make no use from null weights as suggested in Shapley (1953a) or Kalai and Samet (1987).
5We introduce the Shapley levels value with a formula (Calvo, Lasaga and Winter, 1996,
eq. (1)). Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = {B0, ...,Bh+1}, and for all T ∈ ΩN, T 3 i,
KT (i) :=
h∏
r=0
KrT (i), where K
r
T (i) :=
1
|{B ∈ Br : B⊆ Br+1(i), B ∩ T 6= ∅}| .
Then the Shapley Levels value ShL (Winter, 1989) is defined by
ShLi (N, v,B) :=
∑
T⊆N,T3i
KT (i)∆v(T ) for all i ∈ N. (3)
Remark 2.1. If B = B0, ShL coincides with Sh.
Hammer (1977) and Vasil’ev (1978) presented a family of TU-values called Harsanyi
set also known as selectope (Derks, Haller and Peters, 2000). For the definition of the
TU-values in this set, called Harsanyi payoffs, we need a dividend share system
p = (pSi )S∈ΩN, i∈S where
∑
i∈S p
S
i = 1 and p
S
i ≥ 0 for all S ∈ ΩN and all i ∈ S. The set of
all dividend share systems p is denoted by PN. Then for each p ∈ PN we have a Harsanyi
payoff φp∈VN, given by
φpi (N, v) :=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
pSi ∆v(S), i ∈ N.
The following axioms are simple adaptions of standard-axioms for TU-values:
Efficiency, E. For all (N, v,B) ∈ VLN, we have ∑i∈N ϕi(N, v,B) = v(N).
Null player, N. For all (N, v,B) ∈ VLN and i ∈ N a null player in v, we have
ϕi(N, v,B) = 0.
Null player out, NO3. For all (N, v,B) ∈ VLN and j ∈ N a null player in v, we have
ϕi(N, v,B) = ϕi(N\{j}, v,B|N\{j}) for all i ∈ N\{j}.
Additivity, A. For all (N, v,B), (N, v′,B) ∈ VLN, we have
ϕ(N, v,B) + ϕ(N, v′,B) = ϕ(N, v + v′,B).
Winter (1989) introduced a symmetry between components axiom to characterize his
value. There the sum of the payoffs to all players of a component equals the sum of the
payoffs to all players of another component if both components are in the same level,
are subsets of the same component one level higher and both components are symmetric
players in a game where the components are the players. Besner (2018a) used a related
axiom, called weighted proportionality between components, to characterize the weighted
Shapley support levels values. Unlike as before there the components must be dependent
in the game where the components are the players. Then the sums of the payoffs to all
players of both components are in the same proportion as the weights of the components.
Here we present a new similar axiom. The only difference as before: now all players of
the components must be dependent in the originally game instead of the components in
the game with the components as players.
3This axiom is an extension from null player out in Derks and Haller (1999).
6Weighted proportionality within components, WPWC4. For all (N, v,B) ∈
VLN, B = {B0, ...,Bh+1}, w ∈ WB, Bk, B` ∈ Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, such that B` ⊆ Br+1(Bk) and
all i ∈ Bk ∪B` are dependent in v, we have∑
i∈Bk
ϕi(N, v,B)
wBk
=
∑
i∈B`
ϕi(N, v,B)
wB`
.
The following axiom is a special case of the previous one.
Dependency within components, DWC. For all (N, v,B) ∈ VLN, B = {B0, ...,Bh+1},
Bk, B` ∈ Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, such that B` ⊆ Br+1(Bk) and all i ∈ Bk ∪ B` are dependent in v,
we have ∑
i∈Bk
ϕi(N, v,B) =
∑
i∈B`
ϕi(N, v,B).
3 Weighted Shapley alliance levels values
The Shapley levels value, the weighted Shapley support levels values and the weighted
Shapley hierarchy levels values satisfy the level game property. That means that the
total payoff to all players of a component coincides with the payoff to the component if
we would play a game where the components are the players itselves. But this is not
the case5 for our two new classes of weighted values. The values in these classes allow
the players, within the hierarchy of the level structure, to act more independent. So in
the following class they can form subgroups with an own weight within the components
containing them.
E. g., looking at a game where the whole world is the grand coalition. The world
splits up in political unions like the European Union (EU) and countries which remain
fully autonomous. Within the EU many countries are organized as a federal state or a
comparable system and so on. But within the EU are also powerful subgroups possible
like the euro area. Assume that we have found a weight system for the political influence
and power of all countries, states and so on and all possible cooperations of these units.
Using a weighted Shapley support levels value the euro area throws, outside of the EU,
the same weight as the whole EU into the balance! Instead, the following class of values
assigns the euro area exactly the weight it has itself. The structure of the level structure
determines here that always the involved players within a component act together as a
single unit outside of the component.
Definition 3.1. Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = {B0, ...,Bh+1}, w ∈ W2N 6 and for all T ⊆ N,
T 3 i,
Aw,T (i) :=
h∏
r=0
Arw,T (i), where A
r
w,T (i) :=
wBr(i)∩T∑
B∈Br:B⊆Br+1(i),
B∩T 6=∅
wB∩T
. (4)
The weighted Shapley alliance levels value ShwAL is given by
ShwALi (N, v,B) :=
∑
T⊆N,T3i
Aw,T (i)∆v(T ) for all i ∈ N. (5)
4In Nowak and Radzik (1995) the basic version of this axiom for TU-values is called ω-mutual dependence.
5We show that this property is not satisfied in our example in section 6.
6In fact, we need only weights for coalitions S ∈ ΩBh for all Bh∈ Bh.
7Of particular interest in the next theorem are the null player out and the weighted pro-
portionality within components property. In many cases it seems naturally that if a null
player, obtaining a payoff of zero, should not affect the payoff to the other players if he
leaves the game. If all players of two components are dependent means that no one outside
of these components is interested to join a coalition of these players if not all players of
these components are contained in the coalition and inside of both components all players
must act together to obtain anything at all. Then the property that the sum of the payoffs
to players of the first component in proportion to the weight of the first component equals
the sum of the payoffs to players of the second component in proportion to the weight of
the second component cannot be too bad for a weighted value for level structures.
Theorem 3.2. Let w ∈ W2N. The weighted Shapley alliance levels value ShwAL satisfies
E, N, NO, A and WPWC.
For the proof, see appendix 8.1. We obtain an axiomatization of the weighted Shapley
alliance levels values which corresponds in case of a trivial level structure to an axioma-
tization of the weighted Shapley values.
Theorem 3.3. Let w ∈ W2N. ShwAL is the unique LS-value that satisfies E, NO,
WPWC and A.
For the proof, see appendix 8.2. We have an interesting special case if the weights are the
size of the components.
Proposition 3.4. Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = {B0, ...,Bh+1} and w ∈ W2N such that
wS = |S| for all S ∈ ΩBh, Bh∈ Bh, wS ∈ w. Then we have
ShwALi (N, v,B) = Shi(N, v) for all i ∈ N.
For the proof, see appendix 8.3.
3.1 A new characterization of the Shapley levels value and the Owen value
If all weights are equal, the coefficients Aw,T (i) from def. 3.1 equal the KT (i) in defini-
tion (3) of the Shapley levels value. Thus the Shapley levels value (Owen value) is a
special case of a weighted Shapley alliance levels value (weighted Shapley alliance coali-
tion structure value). We obtain, if we replace in the proof of theorem 3.3 WPWC by
DWC the following corollary.
Corollary 3.5. ShL is the unique LS-value that satisfies E, NO, DWC and A.
Remark 3.6. Since a level structure (N, v,B1) ∈ VLN, B1 := {B0,B1,B2}, coincides with
a coalition structure on N we obtain a new axiomatization of the Owen value (Owen,
1977) if we adapt E, NO, DWC and A to games with a coalition structure.
4 Weighted Shapley collaboration levels values
Mostly, if players form hierarchical structured coalitions (here called components) and
a player of such a component is removed from the game, the remaining players of this
8component form a new component and so the structure of the level structure remains
largely intact. In the preliminaries we called the new level structure a restriction of the
old one. But sometimes it is thinkable that the component loses its cohesion. We will
not go so far that the whole level structure breaks apart completely. The cohesion from
components outside of the broken one and all complete components which are subsets of
the remaining player set of the broken component remains unchanged. So we introduce
an internally, by the remaining components, induced restriction of the old level structure.
Definition 4.1. Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = {B0, ...,Bh+1} and T ∈ ΩN: We denote by
BrI |T , 0 ≤ r ≤ h+ 1, the coalition structure on T, named internally induced r-th level
of (N, v,B) to player set T , given by
BrI |T :=
{
{T}, if r = h+ 1,{
B ∈ B : B ⊆ (Br∩ T ), Br∈ Br, B * B′∈ B, B′⊆ (Br∩ T )}, else.
With the level structure BI |T = {B0I |T , ...,Bh+1I |T} ∈ LT the LS-game (T, v,BI |T ) ∈ VLT
is called the internally induced restriction of (N, v,B) to player set T .
The internally induced r-th level BrI |T of a level structure to a player set T consists always
of all largest components of the original level structure which are subsets of T and subsets
of a component of the r-th level of the original level structure.
Now we can formulate a new null player out axiom that uses internally restrictions.
Internal (induced restriction) null player out, INO. For all (N, v,B) ∈ VLN, j ∈ N a
null player in v, we have ϕi(N, v,B) = ϕi(N\{j}, v,BI |N\{j}) for all i ∈ N\{j}.
In the following class of weighted Shapley levels values subgroups of a component which
are a component of a lower level are the actors in the new game if some players leave the
original component, they don’t form a new alliance as by the weighted Shapley alliance
levels values. For instance, let’s have a game where the whole world is the grand coalition
in 1990-91. In a highly simplified scheme and not always historically correct we look at the
Warsaw Pact, formally also known as the ”Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual
Assistance” as a component of the second highest level. In 1990 the former German
Democratic Republic withdraw the Warsaw Pact and left the game by an accession to West
Germany. The truncated Warsaw Pact was splitted up completely in different countries
as independent components shortly thereafter. Within the Soviet Union (USSR) itself a
similar scenario occurred: The withdraw of Lithuania and then also of Estonia and Latvia
from the USSR ended with the dissolution of the USSR.
So we have, greatly simplified, nearly a situation where the following class of values can
be recommended. If a component that is part of a component C one level higher leaves
the game, the cohesion of the remaining components B within C is deleted and each such
component is bargaining with its own weight. The structure and the power of components
outside of C and within a component B remain unconcerned.
Definition 4.2. Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = {B0, ...,Bh+1}, w ∈ WB and for all T ⊆ N,
T 3 i,
Cw,T (i) :=
h∏
r=0
Crw,T (i), with C
r
w,T (i) :=
wBrT(i)∑
B∈B̂r+1T (i)
wB
,
9where BrT (i) is the largest component of all components B`(i), 0 ≤ ` ≤ r, with B`(i) ⊆ T,
Bh+1T (i) := T and
B̂r+1T (i) :=
{{BrT (i)}, if BrT (i) = Br+1T (i),{
B ∈ B : B ( Br+1T (i), B * B′ ∈ B, B′ ( Br+1T (i)
}
, else,
is the set of all largest components which are subsets of Br+1T (i). The weighted Shapley
collaboration levels value ShwCL is given by
ShwCLi (N, v,B) :=
∑
T⊆N,T3i
Cw,T (i)∆v(T ) for all i ∈ N.
A difference between the weighted Shapley alliance levels values and the weighted Shapley
collaboration levels values lies in satisfying a different null player out property.
Theorem 4.3. Let w ∈ WB. The weighted Shapley collaboration levels value ShwCL
satisfies E, N, INO, A and WPWC.
The proof is omitted because it is completely analogous to the proof of theorem 3.2. Also
the following axiomatization extends an axiomatization of the weighted Shapley values
and resembles theorem 3.3 of the weighted Shapley alliance levels values.
Theorem 4.4. Let w ∈ WB. ShwCL is the unique LS-value that satisfies E, INO,
WPWC and A.
The proof is omitted because it is completely analogous to the proof of theorem 3.3. Also
here we obtain an interesting special case if the weights are the size of the components.
Proposition 4.5. Let N ∈ N , (N, v,B) ∈ VLN and w ∈ WB such that wB = |B| for all
B ∈ B, wB ∈ w. Then we have
ShwCLi (N, v,B) = Shi(N, v) for all i ∈ N.
Again the proof is omitted because it is completely analogous to the proof of proposi-
tion 3.4.
5 The Shapley collaboration levels value
As a special case of the weighted Shapley collaboration levels values we present an exten-
sion of the Shapley value to level structures.
Definition 5.1. Let N ∈ N , B = {B0, ...,Bh+1} ∈ LN, v ∈ VLN, and for all T ⊆ N,
T 3 i,
CT (i) :=
h∏
r=0
CrT (i), with C
r
T (i) :=
1∣∣B̂r+1T (i)∣∣ ,
where BrT(i) is the largest component B`(i), 0 ≤ ` ≤ r, B`(i) ⊆ T , Bh+1T (i) := T and
B̂r+1T (i) :=
{
B ∈ B : B ⊆ Br+1T (i), B * B′ ∈ B, B′ ( Br+1T (i)
}
is the set of all largest
components which are subsets of Br+1T (i). The Shapley collaboration levels value
ShCL is given by
ShCLi (N, v,B) :=
∑
T⊆N,T3i
CT (i)∆v(T ) for all i ∈ N.
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Def. 5.1 coincides with def. 4.2 if all weights are equal. If we replace WPWC by DWC
in theorem 4.4, we obtain, similar to corollary 3.5 the following corollary.
Corollary 5.2. ShCL is the unique LS-value that satisfies E, INO, DWC and A.
6 Example
In this section we give a numerical example to compare the sharings for different values.
We recall the level game property Winter (1989) that means that the sum of the payoffs
to all players of a component equals the payoff to this component in a game where the
components are the players. For this we need the definition of an induced level game
where components are the players.
Definition 6.1. Let (N, v,B) ∈ VLN, B = {B0, ...,Bh+1} and T ∈ ΩN. We define for each
level r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, the level structure Br := {Br0, ...,Brh+1−r} ∈ LBr as the induced r-th
level structure from B by considering the components B ∈ Br as players. There all
levels from the original level structure lower then r are dropped and we have Brk := {{B ∈
Br : B ⊆ Br+k} for all Br+k ∈ Br+k}, 0 ≤ k ≤ h + 1 − r. The induced r-th level game(Br, vr,Br) ∈ VLBr, where Br is the player set with B ∈ Br as players, is given by
vr(T ) := v( ⋃
B∈T
B
)
for all T ⊆ Br.
Remark 6.2. For a level structure B = {B0, ...,Bh+1} ∈ LN and an induced r-th level
structure Br related components have the same weights. So we have for all r, k, 0 ≤ r ≤
k ≤ h, Brk−r∈ Brk−r, Brk−r∈ Br, Bk∈ Bk, Bk∈ B,
w
Brk−r = wBk with B
rk−r:= {B ∈ Br: B ⊆ Bk} and w
Br
k−r ∈ WBr, wBk ∈ WB.
It follows the desired property.
Level game property, LG (Winter, 1989). For all (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B =
{B0, ...,Bh+1}, B∈ Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h+ 1, we have∑
i∈B
ϕi(N, v,B) = ϕB(Br, vr,Br).
Let now (N, uS, B) ∈ VLN, w ∈ W2N and w′ ∈ WB, where N := {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, and
B = {B0,B1,B2,B3}, with B1 := {{1, 2}, {3, 4}, {5}}, B2 := {{1, 2, 3, 4}, {5}} and uS the
unanimity game with carrier S := {1, 2, 3, 5} (see Figure 1). Assume that the weights are
exogenously given as shown in Table 1 and reflect, e. g., the political or market power or
something else of the coalitions. For the weight system w′ we use the same weights for
the components as given in the weight system w so that we have w′B = wB for all B ∈ B;
for calculating the weighted Shapley value Shw we use the weight system w ∈ W, given
by wi := w{i} for all i ∈ N .
Table 1: Weights of the coalitions
S {1} {2} {3} {4} {5} {1,2} {1,3} {1,4} {2,3} {2,4} {3,4} {1,2,3} {1,2,4} {1,3,4} {2,3,4} {1,2,3,4}
wS 1 1 1 1 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 7
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{1} {2} {3} {4} {5}
{1,2} {3,4} {5}
{1,2,3,4} {5}
{1,2,3,4,5}
Level: 3
2
1
0
Figure 1: Structure of the components in different levels
We obtain Table 2 where ShwHL is the weighted Shapley hierarchy levels value, pre-
sented in Besner (2018b) and ShwSL is the weighted Shapley support levels value, pre-
sented in Besner (2018a).
Table 2: Comparison of different values
Value Payoff to player 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 ϕ{1,2,3,4}(B2, v2,B2)
∑
i∈{1,2,3,4} ϕi(N, v,B)
Sh(N, v) 1
4
, 1
4
, 1
4
, 0, 1
4
- -
Shw(N, v) 1
8
, 1
8
, 1
8
, 0, 5
8
- -
ShL(N, v,B) 1
8
, 1
8
, 1
4
, 0, 1
2
1
2
1
2
ShwHL(N, v,B) 7
48
, 7
48
, 5
24
, 1
12
, 5
12
7
12
7
12
ShwSL(N, v,B) 7
48
, 7
48
, 7
24
, 0, 5
12
7
12
7
12
ShwAL(N, v,B) 3
16
, 3
16
, 1
8
, 0, 1
2
7
12
1
2
ShwCL(N, v,B) 1
6
, 1
6
, 1
9
, 0, 5
9
7
12
4
9
ShCL(N, v,B) 1
6
, 1
6
, 1
3
, 0, 1
3
1
2
2
3
Discussion: The third column gives the payoff to coalition {1, 2, 3, 4} in the second
level game where coalition {1, 2, 3, 4} is a player. We see, in difference to the other
presented values for level structures, ShwAL, ShwCL and ShCL don’t match the level game
property. ShwHL is the only value that doesn’t satisfy the null player property. Player 3 is
supported by player 4 in the weight w{3,4}. Whereas by ShwHL player 3 passes a share on
to player 4, by ShwSL player 3 takes it all. All weights of coalitions which contain player
4 do not play a role for computing ShwAL and ShwCL. So it is no surprise that the payoff
to all other players wouldn’t change by these values if player 4 would leave the game.
In addition, we see that all presented values are different, especially ShwHL, ShwSL and
ShwAL don’t coincide although they all contain the Shapley levels value! Also of interest
is the fact that players 1 and 2 are treated symmetrically by all values. Both players
are dependent in the coalition function and so symmetric as well, are part of the same
component in the first level and all coalitions which are joined with only one of these
players have as joined coalition for both players the same weights in the related cases.
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7 Conclusion
In an increasingly networked world where sharing of information, data, knowledge, expen-
sive ressources and so on is a matter of fact it is increasingly important for all stakeholders
to share in the benefits. To distribute generated surpluses the presented two new classes
of LS-values, together with the weighted Shapley hierarchy levels values and the weighted
Shapley support levels values, contain alternatives to the Shapley levels value if there
exist exogenously given weights for some coalitions.
The weighted Shapley hierarchy levels values and the weighted Shapley support levels
values meet the level game property but subcoalitions of a component always depend on
the weight of the whole component. An detailed examination of the weighted Shapley
hierarchy levels values shows that by these values, and so also for the Shapley levels
value, the worth of many coalitions, e. g. coalitions which are the union of proper subsets
of pairwise disjoint components, is not relevant for the payoff to all players!
In this regard by the values of our two new classes (the Shapley levels value is here
an exception) the players are more independent from the nesting components. The new
classes offer also an alternative if it is desired that if a null player is removed from the
game there is no change in the payoff to the other players.
The weighted Shapley alliance levels values contain the Shapley levels value as a special
case. So we have three different classes, the weighted Shapley hierarchy levels values, the
weighted Shapley support levels values and the weighted Shapley alliance levels values
which contain all the Shapley levels values. Thus the different axiomatizations by these
classes open different perspectives on the Shapley levels value too.
But a level structure is more then just a sequence of coalition structures, the coalition
structures are ordered in a certain way. Thus we could present a new internally induced
restriction, which should be used for example in the case that a component splits in the
components next in size if one player quits the component. The weighted Shapley collabo-
ration levels values satisfy the null player out property for internally induced restrictions.
So we have found a situation where the Shapley levels value fails and a new extension of
the Shapley value, called Shapley collaboration levels value, is recommended if all weights
are equal or there aren’t any weights at all respectively.
8 Appendix
The following lemma is used in the proofs of theorem 3.2 and theorem 3.3.
Lemma 8.1. Besner (2018a, lemma 7.3) Players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, are dependent in v ∈
VN, iff ∆v(S ∪ {k}) = 0, k ∈ {i, j}, for all S ⊆ N\{i, j}.
8.1 Proof of theorem 3.2
Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = {B0, ...,Bh+1}, w ∈ W2N and Arw,T the expressions according to
def. 3.1.
• E, N, A: Let T ∈ ΩN, j ∈ T. It is clear, by induction on r, that∑
i∈Br+1(j), i∈T
r∏
`=0
Arw,T (i) = 1.
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By
∑
i∈T Aw,T (i) = 1 and Aw,T (i) > 0, i ∈ T, the Aw,T (i) form a dividend share system
p ∈ PN. Thus ShwAL coincides with a Harsanyi payoff. It is well-known that a Harsanyi
payoff satisfies efficiency, additivity and the null player property for TU-values. Thus it
is obvious that ShwAL matches E, A and N.
• NO: It is well-known that each coalition S ∈ ΩN, containing a null player j ∈
N in v, is not active in v. In eq. (5) we have only to consider active coalitions. But
for these coalitions there is no change in the weights. Thus we have ShwALi (N, v,B) =
ShwALi (N\{j}, v,B|N\{j}) for all i ∈ N\{j}.
• WPWC: Let k, ` ∈ N, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, Br(`) ⊆ Br+1(k) and all players i ∈ Br(k) ∪ Br(`)
be dependent in v. We obtain
∑
i∈Br(k)
ShwALi (N, v,B)
wBr(k)
=
Def.
3.1
1
wBr(k)
∑
i∈Br(k)
∑
T⊆N,
T3i
[ h∏
j=0
wBj(i)∩T∑
B∈Bj :B⊆Bj+1(i),
B∩T 6=∅
wB∩T
]
∆v(T )
=
Lem.
8.1
1
wBr(k)
∑
i∈Br(k)
∑
T⊆N,
(Br(k)∪Br(`))⊆T
[ h∏
j=0
wBj(i)∩T∑
B∈Bj :B⊆Bj+1(i),
B∩T 6=∅
wB∩T
]
∆v(T )
=
1
wBr(k)
∑
T⊆N,
(Br(k)∪Br(`))⊆T
∑
i∈Br(k)
[ h∏
j=0
wBj(i)∩T∑
B∈Bj :B⊆Bj+1(i),
B∩T 6=∅
wB∩T
]
∆v(T )
=
1
wBr(k)
∑
T⊆N,
(Br(k)∪Br(`))⊆T
∆v(T )
[
h∏
j=r
wBj(k)∩T∑
B∈Bj :B⊆Bj+1(k),
B∩T 6=∅
wB∩T
·
∑
i∈Br(k)
r−1∏
j=0
wBj(i)∩T∑
B∈Bj :B⊆Bj+1(i),
B∩T 6=∅
wB∩T
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]
=
1
wBr(k)
∑
T⊆N,
(Br(k)∪Br(`))⊆T
∆v(T )
h∏
j=r
wBj(k)∩T∑
B∈Bj :B⊆Bj+1(k),
B∩T 6=∅
wB∩T
=
∑
T⊆N,
(Br(k)∪Br(`))⊆T
∆v(T )
h∏
j=r+1
wBj(k)∩T∑
B∈Bj :B⊆Bj+1(k),
B∩T 6=∅
wB∩T
=
∑
T⊆N,
(Br(k)∪Br(`))⊆T
∆v(T )
h∏
j=r+1
wBj(`)∩T∑
B∈Bj :B⊆Bj+1(`),
B∩T 6=∅
wB∩T
=
∑
i∈Br(`)
ShwALi (N, v,B)
wBr(`)
.
Convention 8.2. To avoid cumbersome case distinctions in the proof of theorem 3.3
using WPWC, if there is only one single player assessed in isolation, she is defined as
dependent by herself. Then WPWC is trivially satisfied.
8.2 Proof of theorem 3.3
Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = {B0, ...,Bh+1}, w ∈ W2N, S ∈ ΩN arbitrary and ϕ an LS-value
that satisfies all axioms of theorem 3.3 and N, because E and NO imply obvious N. Due
7The last sum always equals 1, if r = 0, we have an empty product, which is equal, by convention, to the
multiplicative identity 1.
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to theorem 3.2, property (2) and A, it is sufficient to show that ϕ is uniquely defined on
the game vS := ∆v(S) · uS.
All players j ∈ N\S are null players in vS and so ϕ is unique on vS for all j ∈ N\S by
N. By lemma 8.1, all players i ∈ S, possibly using conv. 8.2, are dependent in vS and, by
NO, we obtain
ϕi(N, vS,B) = ϕi(S, vS,B|S) for all i ∈ S.
So we can use an induction on the restriction to the player set S on the size m, 0 ≤ m ≤ h,
for all levels r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, with m := h− r.
Initialisation: Let m = 0 and so r = h. We get for an arbitrary i ∈ S∑
B∈Bh|S ,
B∩S 6=∅
∑
j∈B
ϕj(N, vS,B|S) =
(WPBC)
∑
B∈Bh|S ,
B∩S 6=∅
wB
wBh|S(i)
∑
j∈Bh|S(i)
ϕj(N, vS,B|S) =
(E)
∆v(S)
⇔
∑
j∈Br|S(i)
ϕj(N, vS,B|S) =
[ h∏
k=h−m
wBk|S(i)∑
B∈Bk|S :B⊆Bk+1|S(i),
B∩S 6=∅
wB
]
∆v(S). (6)
Induction step: Assume that eq. (6) holds to ϕ with an arbitrarym−1, 0 ≤ m−1 ≤ h−1
(IH). It follows for an arbitrary i ∈ S∑
B∈Br|S , B∩S 6=∅,
B⊆Br+1|S(i)
∑
j∈B
ϕj(N, vS,B|S) =
(WPBC)
∑
B∈Br|S , B∩S 6=∅,
B⊆Br+1|S(i)
wB
wBr|S(i)
∑
j∈Br|S(i)
ϕj(N, vS,B|S)
=
(IH)
[ h∏
k=h−m+1
wBk|S(i)∑
B∈Bk|S :B⊆Bk+1|S(i),
B∩S 6=∅
wB
]
∆v(S)
⇔
∑
j∈Br|S(i)
ϕj(N, vS,B|S) =
[ h∏
k=h−m
wBk|S(i)∑
B∈Bk|S :B⊆Bk+1|S(i),
B∩S 6=∅
wB
]
∆v(S).
So ϕ is uniquely defined on vS (take m = h and so r = 0).
8.3 Proof of proposition 3.4
Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = {B0, ...,Bh+1}, and w ∈ W2N such that wS = |S| for all S ∈ ΩBh,
Bh∈ Bh, wS ∈ w. We have only to show that
Aw,T (i) =
1
|T | for all T ⊆ N, T 3 i.
For all T ⊆ N, T 3 i, and 0 ≤ r ≤ h the set B˜r+1T (i) := {B ∩ T : B ∈ Br, B ⊆
Br+1(i), B ∩ T 6= ∅} is a partition of Br+1(i) ∩ T . So we have∑
B∈B˜r+1T (i)
wB∩T =
∑
B∈Br:B⊆Br+1(i),
B∩T 6=∅
wB∩T = |Br+1(i) ∩ T |.
By line (4) we get Aw,T (i) =
1
|T | as desired.
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8.4 Logical independence
Let B = B0. All our axioms coincide in this case with axioms for TU-values which
characterize the weighted Shapley values or the Shapley values. There it is well-known or
easy to prove that the axioms are logical independent. Thus it is clear that the axioms,
used in our axiomatizations, must be logical independent too.
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